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Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence:
Joseph Goldsteint
Psychoanalysis endeavors to provide a systematic theory of human
behavior. Law, both as a body of substantive decisions and as a process
for decisionmaking, has been created by man to regulate the behavior
of man. Psychoanalysis seeks to understand the workings of the mind.
Law is mind-of-man-made. There is in law, as psychoanalysis teaches
that there is in individual man, a rich residue which each generation
preserves from the past, modifies for the present, and leaves for the
future. An initial, though tentative assumption that one discipline is
relevant to the other seems therefore warranted. The congruence of
their concern for man, his mind, his behavior, and his environment
may justify this assertion of mutual relevance. But it does nothing to
demarcate the potential use and potential limits of psychoanalysis as an
aid to understanding the meaning and function of law. This essay ex-
plores some of the contributions psychoanalytic theory may make to
jurisprudence and, perhaps more significantly, seeks to locate and ex-
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amine the boundaries which mark the potential area of any such con-
tribution.
Though law is stereotypically perceived as being concerned with an
external image of man, and psychoanalysis with his internal image,
each discipline is in fact concerned 3vith both faces of man. While
legal training, practice, and research concentrate primarily on man's
external world, the substance and process of law depend heavily on
assumptions about man's internal world. While psychoanalytic train-
ing, practice and research focus primarily on an internal view of man,
the theory and therapy of psychoanalysis have always had an ear and
an eye to outer reality-and increasingly so with the development of
genetic and adaptive vantage points in metapsychology. 1 Both disci-
plines then must cross common intellectual territory. Lawyers, for
example, may ask of law in terms of its social control function what
psychoanalysts might ask of man in terms of his adaptive capacities:
"To what extent are internal mechanisms of control reflected in and
affected by the development of external controls?"
Yet the integration of psychoanalysis and jurisprudence is not close
at hand, and the scant beginning has occurred only at a relatively su-
perficial descriptive level. It may be that psychoanalysis as theory is
too young and incomplete. It may be that psychoanalysis as a data-
gathering technique is inadequate to provide a basis for developing
a general psychology of man. Or it may be that the psychoanalytic
theory of man as an individual is too complex to permit productive
explorations of what may be even more complex-groups of human
beings interacting in the legal process. This state of intellectual affairs
may, on the other hand) be attributable not to psychoanalysis, but to
legal theory. It may be that problems in jurisprudence are inadequately
defined or excessively bound by linguistic analysis and functionless
1. Freud defined metapsychology as the study of the assumptions upon which the sys.
tern of psychoanalytic theory is based. S. FaRun, Metapsychologicd Suppletnent to the
Theory of Dreams, in 14 THE STANDARD Eurrion or THE COMPLETE PAYGIIOLOGICAL WORiKS
of SIGMUND FREUD 222 n.1 (J. Strachey ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited SE.].
These assumptions are typed according to five points of view-the dynanic, the topo-
graphic, the economic, the genetic, and the adaptive. Briefly and possibly too cryptically.
these viewpoints require that the psychoanalytic explanation of any psychological phe-
nomenon include propositions concerning: (1) the psychological forces (dynamic), (2) the
psychological energy (economic), and (3) the psychological configurations (structural) in-
volved in the phenomenon, as well as propositions concerning: (4) the psychological origin
and development (genetic) of the phenomenon, and (5) its relationship to the environment
(adaptive). Rapaport and Gill, The Points of View and Assumptions of Metapsyehology,
in THE COLLEED FAx's or DAvw RAP ORT 795-811 (M. Gill ed, 1967).
"Even though in various psychoanalytic propositions one or another metapsychological
point of view Or assumption may be dominant, all psychoanalytic propoitions involve all
metapsychological points of view." Id. 797.
1054
Vol. 77: 1053, 1968
Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence
questions, For these or for other reasons, a mere exchange of maps
charting the terrain for each discipline may reveal nothing but a no-
man's land between-a no-man's land in the sense both of an area
separating hostile forces, and of an area for which no one claims re-
sponsibility. Thus, in searching for a common ground between psycho-
analysis and jurisprudence, the assumption of mutual relevance must
constantly be challenged. The no-man's land may be mined with frus-
tration, or even raked by cross-fire. But hopefully the possible ambit
of, as well as the limits to, the contribution psychoanalytic theory may
make to law will begin to emerge.
I.
Before exploring the ways psychoanalysis may enrich the law, the
variegated nature of each must be heeded. Neither the concept of psy-
choanalysis nor the concept of law is unitary. In theory, in practice,
and in research, psychoanalysis like law is both a set of concepts and
a process of interaction, Psychoanalysis is a theory of man as an indi-
vidual, how he may have become what he is, and how he may change
or be changed, Psychoanalysis is also a mode of therapy, a means pre-
eminently of helping an individual understand what he is and why,
and thereby liberating him to accept the strength and limits of his po-
tential and perhaps to change himself. Finally, psychoanalysis is a
method of investigation, a research tool to further theory and to im-
prove therapy 2
Law, too, appears in many garbs. It is a part of man's reality, a mech-
anism for molding and reinforcing controls over himself in relation
to others, an instrument that assigns to man-made authority, the state,
the power to decide why, under what circumstances, to what extent,
and by what means man as a private person is to be restrained or en-
couraged in the making and implementing of his decisions as an indi-
vidual. Law is, in turn, a device to control the state--or, strictly
speaking, the individuals who act as decisionmakers for the state-in
the exercise of its power over man. The underlying question always
confronting the decisionmakers in the exercise of their discretion is
whether, how and to what extent the state should not or should be
2. "Psychoanalysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of mental pro-
cesses which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that
investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders, and (3) of a collection of pycydto-
logical information obtained along these lines, which is gradually being accumulated into
a new scientific discipline." S. FaLmu, Psycho-analysis, in 18 SE. 235.
1055
The Yale Law Journal
authorized to intervene in what would otherwise be the private order-
ing of a man's life.
Law is at the same time the guardian of a powerful substantive heri-
tage, as well as a generator and regenerator of fundamental societal
values. It is a concrete and continuous process for meeting both man's
need for stability by providing authority, rule, and precedent, and his
need for flexibility by providing for each authority a counter-authority.
for each rule a counter-rule and for each precedent a counter-precedent.
In deciding between available alternatives and among oft-conflicting
goals, law ideally allows, encourages, and secures an environment con-
ducive to man's growth and development. Of course the degree of sta-
bility, flexibility, growth, and development achieved through law
varies over time, both as to subject matter and as to points of decision.
The process is and must be a complicated one that changes as man,
his knowledge, or the conditions which surround him change. To the
extent law provides a proper mix of continuity and flexibility, it pro.
vides the basis for a stable, vital and viable society capable of keeping
its revolutions peaceful. 3 Thus the study of law focuses, or should focus,
upon the ways in which this process meets or fails to meet these needs.
In 1881, when a young medical student named Sigmund Freud was
conducting research on the nerve cells of crayfish,4 Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., spoke of the law as psychoanalysis has come to speak of
man. He observed:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story
of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries
of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become .... [T]he
most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the
two into new products at every stage .... [T]he degree to which
it is able to work out desired results depend[s] very much upon its
past.
3. "No lawyer worthy of the name can ever be either truly a conservative or truly a
radical: at one and the same time we must somehow devote ourselves to the preservation
of tradition, which we do not greatly respect, and to the promotion of change, in which
we do not greatly believe." Gilmore, The Truth About Harvard and Yale, YALE L, Rt,
Winter 1964, at 9.
4. 1 E. JoNEs, Tim LirE AND WoRK oF SIGMUND FREUD 48 (1953).
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The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of
history. ... It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first
step toward an enlightened scepticism .... When you get the
dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can
count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.
The student of law, then, must always ask, "What is or should be
the purpose of the decision?" and "What must I learn to make a deci-
sion compatible with that purpose?" Since the law is concerned with
every aspect of human activity,0 and since its decisions are not bound
by logic, the work and the findings of many disciplines are not only
appropriate but may be essential sources of data. This does not mean
that a lawyer ought indiscriminately to collect data, but rather that
he must first determine what he seeks to do and then pose for himself
a series of questions which should be tested by the underlying question:
"In what way would any possible answer to the question posed be rele-
vant to that which the lawyer (on behalf of society, the state, an
individual client, himself, or any combination of these) seeks to accom-
plish?"7 The form these questions will take may vary with the ambit of
discretion of the decisionmaker and the point of decision in the legal
process. Thus, to draw on questions framed with cautious expectations
for the Katz, Goldstein, and Dershowitz text, the decisionmaker creat-
ing or applying law might ask:
To what extent does, can, or should the State take into account
the unconscious in the promulgation, invocation and administra-
tion of its law?
Should the unconscious be taken as a characteristic common to
all human activity, and thus deemed of no special significance to
decisions in law?s
5. Holmes, The Place of History in Understanding Law, in Tun LIF oF iE LAw 3(J. Honnold ed. 1964). Interestingly, in Analysis Terminable and Interminable Freud
writes, "All that has once lived clings tenaciously to life. Sometimes we are inclined to
doubt whether the dragons of primaeval times are really extinct." 23 S.E. 229.
6. The law, as a subject for study, includes any problem for decision which may con-
front any agency of the state, as well as any decisions which explicitly, implicitly, or by
default place certain areas of human activity outside the ambit of official concern or
regulation.
7. This question of functional anal)sis, obvious once posed, has been overlooked, for
example, in the years of fruitless debate which persists in search of a formula for an
insanity defense to criminal responsibility. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish The "Insanity
Defense"--Why Not? 72 YALE UJ. 853 (1963).
8. J. KATz, J. GOLIsTEIN, & A. DERsHoWrrz, PSYCUO.,NALYsiS, PsymuATR" Aso LAw 51
(1967) [hereinafter cited as KArz, GonsrmN & Dsasnowrrzl.
With regard to a particular problem, criminal responsibility, the question might be put
this way: What is the function, purpose, and relevance of the mental elements of intent
(mens rea) and voluntariness which are requisite to the definition of most major criminal
offences? Should the law, for example, authorize different official responses for (a) the indi-
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The student of the law, in addition to examining questions relevant
to the decisionmaker's task, might inquire more broadly into the na-
ture and purposes of the law:
Are there forces in man interacting within him and among men
which require the creation of some external authority to admin-
ister man in his day-to-day relations with himself and others?
Does law develop out of a recognition, express or implied, that
id out of control would destroy us as individuals and aS a society?
Does law rest on the assumption that man has both an ego and
a superego, which require nutriment for the control of id?
Does law, though a part of reality, develop as do ego and super-
ego, out of a continuous interaction with id and reality?9
Do exceptions to legal proscriptions in such forms as defenses,
excuses, and justifications serve to preserve the autonomy of the
ego from environmental pressures which ultimately might reduce
the autonomy of the ego from the id?10
The temptation is strong to attempt a single, all-explanatory response
to these questions. Thus, in the idiom of psychoanalysis, law might be
discussed as a secondary process phenomenon, as a function and prod-
uct of the ego enhancing its control Over id impulses. It could be per-
ceived as a generally non-violent external means for regulating aggres.
sion by mouth as well as by hand and arm. These organs, as psycho-
analysts have noted, may function as instruments for the discharge of
aggressive energy. 1 But while psychoanalysis invoked in this fashion
supplies new words to describe the loud voice, the heavy hand, and the
long arm of the law, it does not necessarily furnish new insights about
law,. Long before the law had a psychoanalytic window, it was viewed
as an adversary process, as a substitute of trial by words for trial by
combat. Indeed, Freud in an early writing attributes to an unnamed
Englishman the observation that "the man who first flung a word of
abuse at his enemy instead of a spear was the founder of civilization."' 2
vidual whose "conscious intent" differs from his "unconscious intent," and (b) the Indi.
vidual whose "conscious and 'unconscious intent" coincide-assuming these concepts can
be given meaning? If official responses should differ, how should and can the difference be
manifested? Or does the law make a theoretically valid point, from a psychoanalytic point
of view, when it creates an evidentiary rule that "intent" of the accused can be determined
from his overt conduct since it is to be assumed that "man intends the natural conse-
quences of his acts"?
9. Id. 5, 87.
10. This question is added by the author.
11. "[A]ggression ... has a specific relation to certain organs, e.g., to the mouth, to
the hands, or the arms, but these organs do not appear as sources of stimulation; as far
a aggression is concerned, they function as instruments of discharge." Hartmann, ltis,
& Loewenstein, Notes on the Theory of Aggression, PsYcatOLoGicAL Issuts, vol. 4, no. 2,
monograph 14, 1964, at 56, 85.
12, S. FREtu, On the Psychical Mechanism Of HysteriCal Phenomena, 3 S.E DO,
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The vividness and the richness of this prepsychoanalytic remark should
not, however, obscure the need for a systematic theory which can con-
tribute to a greater and more detailed understanding of the meaning
of justice for man who is, at one and the same time, "law-making,"
"law-abiding," and "law-breaking."
Thus, the search must be not for jargon-laden formulas which merely
cast aged platitudes into specious scientific terms, but for focused in-
sights into particular areas or aspects of the law. In doing this, it is
important to locate the limits of psychoanalytic theory in understand-
ing the dynamics of law as a product of, stimulator of, and regulator for
human behavior. Marking the limits will at the same time delineate
the area of potential contribution.
II.
Law cannot find in psychoanalysis, or for that matter in any science,
the moral, political, or social values upon which to base or evaluate its
decisions. Psychoanalytic theory cannot provide guides to the "good"
or the "bad." Yet in appraising decisions designed to serve the "good"
and undermine the "bad," psychoanalysis may provide insights which
suggest a modification of the means by which society, through law,
seeks to fulfill its goals.
Nothing in psychoanalytic theory, for example, can supply the moral
values which should inform the law's decision in the legislative debate
about whether and why abortion should or should not be singled out
from other surgical procedures for special social controls. Nor can it
provide the values to guide a judge or legislator deciding the validity
of a document, signed by an adult in the prime of life, requiring that
his life be extinguished at a specified age so as to avoid an "unpleasant"
prolongation through newly devised medical procedures m Nor can it
provide the ethical or moral standards to regulate through law the con-
I. Toupees, false teeth, spectacles, cosmetics, girdles and arch supports, are accepted
means of compensating for time's unkind arrows. Recently, corneal transplants, plas.
tic arteries, and whole transplanted kidneys, even artificial hearts and kidne)s, have
received much attention and will no doubt solve some acute medical problems. How-
ever, the picture of a patched and pasted bicentenarian being transported by pneu-
matic tube from heart-lung machine to artifidal kidney to arifidal liver, perhap3
feebly twitching his servo-musculature or enjoying direct 3-dimensional video tape
transmission to his occipital cortex (because of blindness) is not presently an attrac-
tive alternative to an extended sleep and I doubt that man will move with much
satisfaction in that direction.
Bernard L Strehler, untitled essay presented to the Conference on Aging sponored b)
the Harvard Program on Technology and Society on Feb. 18, 1957.
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duct of experiments on human beings or animals. The psychoanalyst,
as scientist, cannot say what conduct, if any, should be considered a
ground for divorce, punishment, or excuse from punishment. Nor can
he pronounce who should be held or relieved of responsibility, or what
the function of a finding of responsibility should be. He cannot, to
take a specific example, provide the law with guides for deciding
whether homosexual acts between consenting adults should be subject
to criminal sanction. The insidious temptation to take Freud's Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality as an affirmative vote for genitality
and thus as a justification for official social condemnation of what he
neutrally labels "a perversion.-"a pathological disorder"-must be
resisted.14 As Szasz so dramatically argues, the failure of the decision-
maker in the legal process to recognize that psychoanalysis is not a
source of moral values, as well as the failure of the psychoanalyst to
make clear to himself and others when he is speaking as scientist and
when merely as citizen, has contributed to much of the confusion, chaos,
and injustice which surrounds the administration of our mental health
laws.1r Less prominently, though not necessarily less significantly, these
blurred identities have cast doubt on the work of some psychoanalysts
and psychiatrists writing about problems in law. Without advising
their readers or possibly themselves, they abandon their value-neutral
scientific perspective and present their personal value preferences cam-
ouflaged in the language of psychoanalysis.16 Freud, the scientist, makes
this point in his essay on Moral Responsibility for the Content of
Dreams when he writes, albeit somewhat sarcastically, "The physician
will leave it to the jurist to construct for social purposes a responsi-
bility that is artificially limited to the metapsychological ego."17
Psychoanalysis may, however, help the legal decisionmaker by forc-
ing into view conflicts between existing rules and preferred values
which he may not see or may not wish to acknowledge. Thus, while a
judge will not turn to psychoanalysis to determine whether the trial
process should require "belief beyond a reasonable doubt" in order
to find a person guilty of a criminal offense, he may, given the value
14. S. FREuD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 7 S.E. 135, 160-62, 208-12.
15. Statement of Thomas Szasz, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Mentally Ill of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong,, 1st
Sess., pt. 1, 251-72 (1961); T. SZASZ, THE MyTH or MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). See also Wadider,
Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. Rzv. 378 (192);
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853, 870 (1963).
16. See generally KATz, GoLDsTEIN & DERsuowrrz, ch. II (1967).
17. S. Freud, Some Additional Notes on Dream-Interpretation as a Whole, 19 s.E.
132, 134.
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preference for minimizing the chance of error which supports the
reasonable doubt standard, draw on insights from psychoanalysis in
determining whether the standard has been met in a particular case.
One judge, for example, has re-examined the evidentiary rule which
infers guilt from the act of flight. Courts and legal commentators have
assumed, on the basis of what they call "common"e experience, (1) that
a person who flees shortly after a criminal act is committed or after
being accused of a crime does so because he feels some guilt about
that act, and (2) that one who feels some guilt concerning an act is
guilty of committing that act. The first principle has been roundly
criticized, and some decisions have acknowledged that a man may flee
for reasons other than a sense of guilt. The second rule, however, has
generally been accepted uncritically.'8
In 1963 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided
to modify the rule in response to Freud's warning to lawyers in 1906
that
[Y]ou may be led astray by a neurotic who, although he is inno-
cent, reacts as though he were guilty, because a lurking sense of
guilt that already exists in him seizes upon the accusation made
in the particular instance... It can be that he has in fact not
committed the particular crime with which you have charged him
but that he has committed one of which you know nothing and
of which you are not accusing him. He therefore quite truthfully
denies being guilty of the one misdeed, while at the same time
betraying his sense of guilt on account of the other."10
Accordingly, without altering the function or purpose of the rule, the
appellate court changed its content to recognize a more complex image
of man as a guilt-feeling animal:
When evidence of flight has been introduced into a case, . . .
the trial court should.., explain to the jury... that flight does
not necessarily reflect feelings of guilt, and that feelings of guilt,
which are present in many innocent people, do not necessarily
reflect actual guilt.20
The implications of psychoanalytic insights about the relationship
between feeling guilty (or, for that matter, not feeling guilty) and
18. See 1 J. WGMoRE, EviDENcE § 173 (3d ed. 1940).
19. S. Faaro, Psychoanalysis and the Establishment of Facts in Legal Proceedings, 9
S.E. 103, 113. The court relied on a slightly different translation from S. FrauDo Psycho-
Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law, 2 CoLLED PAPEnS 13, 23(1956).
20. Mller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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actually being guilty in a legal sense are still to be explored in im-
portant areas of the law-confessions, guilty pleas, and particularly
admissions of guilt by juveniles in delinquency proceedings.
What Hartmann said of the relationship between psychoanalysis
as therapy and an individual patient's moral code may be said as well
of the relationship of psychoanalysis as theory to the legal process,
Psychoanalysis cannot provide "the ultimate ends for the moral aspects
of personal, social or political behavior. But... contributions toward
clariication and organization, in the framework of a given system of
valuations, or more specifically in the framework of given moral codes
. . . can be gained simply and directly from psychoanalytic knowl.
edge.' 2' Thus, despite this limitation which psychoanalysis shares with
all science, a very significant sector of potential and actual application
to law emerges.
A quite different, but related limitation can be discerned in the
manner in which the court applied its psychoanalytic knowledge about
feelings of guilt to the evidentiary rule on flight. The appellate court
limited its use of such knowledge to the revision of a legal assumption
21. H. HARTMANN, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MORAL VALUES 100-01 (1960).
[P]sychoanalysis as a science cannot be expected to provide us with ultimate moral
aims, or general moral imperatives; these cannot be deduced from its empirical find-
ings, This is not to say that we cannot Make any statements on such alms, , ,. We
can form a scientific opinion on what strivings they will, or will not, gratify, on their
synergisms and antagonisms with other mental tendencies. But beyond this the "su-
periority" of one "Weltanchauung" over another one canpot be proved analytically,
On the other hand, taking this for granted, psychoanalytic insight can often be used
as a superior tool; it can contribute in the domain of means-end relationships toward
the realization of personal, social or cultural values. In addition, psychoanalytic un-
derstanding can powerfully contribute to the more peripheral elaborations of the basic
imperatives in the moral codes.
Id. 60. See also Moore, Psychoanalysis, Man and Values, in PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPO-
RARY AmERICAN CULTRE 40-53 (H. Ruitenbeek ed. 1964); and Zinberg, The Problem of
Values ij Teaching Psychoanaly~is Psychiatry, 31 BULL, OF TIH MENNINGER CLINIC 236
(1Th
. 
psychoanalyst's belief that an extensive understanding of a patient's psychological
state and its relationship to all of his life experience is good could be said to be the
basis of psychoapalysis itself as a therapeutic technique ... . The Second value to
consider-the belief that we as analysts cannot and should not judge or, in rnany
instances, direct our patients-contains the essence of the stereotyped view of psycho.
analysts. In the deepest sense, judgment occurs in every human interaction, pad in
this total sense, the analyst does judge his patients. But he does not judge them by
conventiopal moral standards: he "judges" apd values the patient's understanding of
himself and his taking responsibility for his own choices and decisions, We direct
patients, too, but so differently from the usual medical doctor that the whole con.
cept is changed. When we say, "Tell us your thoughts and fantasies," we give direc-
tions similar to the request for a medical history of symptoms. But after the history
is obtained and a diagnosis is made, the medical doctor can prescribe penicillin or
some other drug. If the patient refuses to cooperate in watching his regimen, someone
else can help. The analyst cannot prescribe understanding. The patient must accept





about the nature of mah, It did not concern itself with the meaning
of flight as a psychic act for the particular defendant in the particular
case. Nor did it advise the trial judge or jury to engage in such curb-
stone psychoanalysis-that is, the interpretation of an individual's
conduct or feelings without access to the one source of evidence which
distinguishes psychoanalysis from all other disciplines: the individual's
associations observed over a very substantial period of time in a very
special setting.2
By contrast, it is a cute, tempting, and potentially destructive abuse
of "pyschoanalysis" for a teacher examining the decision in a famous
attempted murder case to suggest that the defendant was revealing his
sexual impotence when he shouted, "It won't fire. It won't fire," as he
held an unloaded pistol at his estranged wife's head and pulled the
trigger.P Such remarks are of no value in examining the function and
purpose of the law of attempted murder, and are of no relevance or
reliability in assessing the criminal responsibility of the particular
defendant. That Vreud was aware of the danger of such misuse of
psychoanalytic insights is made implicit by his observations concern-
ing a homicide case in which expert testimony on the universality of
the Oedipus complex and of the death wishes son hold for fathers vras
used to indict and convict one Philip Halsmann of murdering his
22. [M]etapsychological assessments of the patient's personalities axe carried out after
treatment, not before it, and are based on a specific type of observation which is
inseparable from the analytic setting. It proceeds in the atmosphere of dose intimacy
which is established between the persons of the observer and observed, ie., betw-eea
analyst and patient. It is carried out with the knowledge and agreement of the pa-
tient and relies on his active cooperation, on the sincerity of his verbal communica-
tions, on following, together with him, the subtle variations of his behaviour within
the analytic session, his affects whether verbalised or dramatised, his accounts of
dreams and phantasies, his resistancet, Snd the re-living of past experience transferred
onto and centered around the person of the analyst, Served by the method of free
association St the tool of exploration, the analyst of adults restricts this observation
intentionally to the subjective material given by the patient himself about himself.
A. Freud, Diagnostic Skills and Their Growth in Psychoanalysis, in J. GowsrMn &
J. KA:TZ, THE FAmLY AND THE LAw 959 (1965). "[T]he analyst is tied to his own laborious
and slow method of observation and sees no more without it than the bacteriologst,
deprived of his microscope, sees of bacilli with his naked eye." A. FnmJD, NonUrArI AND
PATHOLOdY IN CHITMHOOD 12 (1965). See also L. Sro4a, Tim Ps'cnOANALrc SrruoN
(1961).
23. See State v. Damms, 9 Wis. 2d 183, 186, 100 N.V.2d 592, 594 (1960). E. Jo.s 3
THE IE AND WORK OF S:iGsND FRmm 88 (1953):
In November [1922] the son of an old servant of Freud's shot his father, though not
fatally, while the latter was in the act of raping the ybuth's half-sister. Freud did not
know the youth personally, but his humanitarian nature was always moved by sym-
pathy with juvenile delinquents. So, paying all the legal expenses himself, he engaged
Dr, Valentin Teirich, the leading authority in that sphere and founder of an insti-
tution for the reform of judicial procedures in such cases, to defend the youth. He
alto wrote a memorandum saying that hny attempt to seek for dbeper motives would
only obscure the plain facts.
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father, despite the absence of objective proof that he had in fact killed
his father. Freud warned:
Precisely because it is always present, the Oedipus complex is
not suited to provide a decision on the question of guilt. The
situation envisaged in a well-known anecdote might easily be
brought about. There was a burglary. A man who had a jemmy in
his possession was found guilty of the crime. After the verdict had
been given and he had been asked if he had anything to say, he
begged to be sentenced for adultery at the same time-since he
was carrying the tool for that on him as well.24
It may seem paradoxical that, while psychoanalysis is a theory based
on individual personal introspective data, an important limit on the
contribution of psychoanalysis to law is the general inapplicability of
its concepts to specific participants without infinitely more information
about them than is usually available. Yet, since law must concern itself
primarily with men in groups and the resolution of group problems
or the group resolution of external conflicts, the proper application
of psychoanalysis as a general theory of human behavior can only be
assured if this very significant limitation is acknowledged. This un-
equivocal condemnation of casual psychoanalytic speculations about the
mental lives of particular individuals is re-inforced by two important
findings of psychoanalysis which must be made explicit.
A.
The first finding is that what appears to be similar behavior, whether
perceived as a symptom of illness or a sign of health, may for different
people be a reflection of and response to a wide range of different and
even opposite unconscious forces. In like fashion different conduct on
the part of different individuals may be a consequence of similar under-
lying psychic factors.25
Law, depending on its purposes, may in appropriately different ways
take into account this psychoanalytic finding. For example, in constru-
ing the congressional exemption for conscientious objectors from com-
24. S. FREUD, The Expert Opinion in the Halsmann Case, 21 S.E. 251, 252.
25. "[Ejxperience has shown that details of behavior that in a cross.sectional atialysis
appear indistinguishable may clearly be differentiated by genetic investigation. Con.
versely, details of behavior that in a :cross-sectional analysis appear different and are
actually opposite may have grown out of the same root, and may justify the same prog.
nosis." Hartmann & Kris, The Genetic Approach in Psychoatalysis, PSYCHOLOGICAL IsSUES,
vol. 4, no. 2, monograph 14, 1964, at 7, 15. See also A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY
IN CHIDHOOD 108-47 (1965).
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batant service the Supreme Court has wisely not required draft boards
to distinguish between those whose pacifism might be, for example,
a response to the death wish or the wish to live, or a reaction "to the
wish to attack" or "to the fear of being ttacked"201 or "against impulses
of the anal-sadistic phase,112 7 and those for whom pacifism might have
become a relatively independent structure through what Hartmann
calls the "phenomenon of change of function."2- Though such distinc-
tions between individual pacifists may be of use for diagnostic and
therapeutic purposes,2 they cannot assist Congress, the courts, or admin-
istrators in finding a meaningful compromise to the conflicts which
may arise under any mass conscription system between two basic values
which the statutory exemption is designed to safeguard: the conscience
of the individual and the security of the state30 By failing to consider
the unconscious origins of the individual draftee's pacifism in deter-
mining who is entitled to conscientious objector status, the law does
not deny the existence of unconscious forces; rather it recognizes that
the universality of such internal forces makes them (like the adulterer's
tool) irrelevant to the evaluation of the individual's claim, which is a
claim not to therapy, but to exemption.
26. Hartmann & Kris, The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis, PSYCoLOC1CAL ISusS.
vol. 4, no. 2, monograph 14, 1964, at 7, 15.
27. Rapaport, The Autonomy of the Ego, in Tim CoLLEcrED PAPmS OF DAvW RAPA-
PORT 357, 364 (A. Gill ed. 1967).
28. See pp. 1067-68 infra.
29. Except for analytic purposes unconscious forces and processes cannot be reparated
from external processes-from external reality. Though external and internal (psycdic)
reality are inextricably linked, the gap between them, as we have noted concerning feel-
ings of guilt, may be substantial.
[Tjhe object of psychoanalytic observation is, according to Freud, not the individual
in splendid isolation: it is a part of a world. Psychoanalysis does not daim to explain
human behavior only as a result of drives and fantasies; human behavior is directed
toward a world of men and things.
Hartmann 8- Kris, The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis, PsycntoLc.AL IssttEs, vol. 4,
no. 2, monograph 14, 1964, at 7, 23.
g0. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Mr. Justice Clark, explaining for
the Court "the rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objection to var
accorded by Congress," id. at 169-70, cited with approval Stone, The Conscientious Ob-
jector, 21 CoLur. U.Q. 253, 259 (1919):
[B]oth morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate the con-
science of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty
of conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy of presereation at
the hands of the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the in-
tegrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation
of the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the
state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the
individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process.
On these and other values in issue, see NATIONAL ADvIsoRY CoMMssixeON oN S. crciv
SERVICE, REPORT: IN PuRsurr OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOr ALL SRVE.:? 111 (1967):
The Commission sought to find the means of securing the manpower needed for
our national security in a manner as consistent as possible with human dignity, indi-
vidual liberty, fairness to all citizens, and the other principles and traditions of a
democratic and free society.
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However, psychoanalysis may have a contribution to make to the
decision as to which categories of objectors should receive exemptions
if the congressional purpose that the state should not violate the indi-
vidual's conscience is to be realized. The 1864 and 1917 draft laws
exempted members of any recognized religious Sect for which oppo-
sition to war was an article of faith. In the draft laws of 1940 and 1948,
Congress abandoned this relatively formalistic and impersonal stan.
dard, as both too broad and too narrow.81 Instead, it adopted a more
flexible, personal, and ambiguous standard which exempts any person
"who by means of religious training and belief is conscientiously op.
posed to war in any form" and which further provides that "[r]eligious
training and belief.., means an individual's belief in a relation to
a Supreme Being. . . , but does not include essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 32 In
1965 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Seeger,33 interpreted the
congressional mandate for local draft boards by adopting a test which
without disturbing the legislative language, and despite disclaimers
to the contrary, significantly changes its meaning. The Court said:
We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of
fact in these cases.... While the applicant's words may differ, the
test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one,
namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life
of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of
one clearly qualified for exemption?
Moreover, it must be remembered that in resolving these exemp-
tion problems one deals with the beliefs of different individuals
who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In such an in-
tensely personal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that
his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given
great weight.... The validity of what he believes cannot be ques-
tioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be
tempted to question the existence of the registrant's "Supreme
Being" or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries fore.
dosed to Government .... Local boards and courts in this sense
are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them "incom-
prehensible." Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed
by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
scheme of things, religious.
But we hasten to emphasize that while the "truth" of a beliet is
not open to question, there remains the significant question
31. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171-73 (1965).
32, Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612.
33. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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whether it is "truly held." This is the threshold question of sin-
cerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a
question of fact-a prime consideration to the validity of every
claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides
a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeals Board in making
this determination, placing at their service the facilities of the
Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation and hearing examiners.3 4
In construing the congressional standard so as virtually to obliterate
the distinction betwveen "religious," "philosophic," and a "merely
personal moral" pacifism, and thereby avoiding difficult constitutional
questions, the Court seems to have recognized the impossibility of
making meaningful distinctions among the consciences of applicants
who so intellectualize their instinctual lives that their pacifism rings
sincere, appears "truly held," by objective standards. Draft boards
are not to question the external or internal origins of the belief but
only the intensity or sincerity with which the belief is held in order
thereby to determine whether the "claimed belief [occupies] the same
place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds
in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption."310 The Court further
declared: "[TWhe statute does not distinguish between externally and
internally derived beliefs." 37 From a psychoanalytic vantage point, the
Court seems intuitively to have assumed in establishing its criteria for
decision that the pacifism of some conscientious objectors (and it is not
necessary to know which individual ones) may be explained not only
in terms of some reaction formation, but also in terms of the "phenom-
enon of change of function," which Hartmann describes:
[A] behavior form which originated in a certain realm of life
may, in the course of development, appear in an entirely different
realm and role. An attitude which arose originally in the service
of defense against an instinctual drive may, in the course of time,
become an independent structure, in which case the instinctual
drive merely triggers this automatized apparatus.. . , but, as long
as the automatization is not controverted, does not determine the
details of its action. Such an apparatus may, as a relatively inde-
pendent structure, come to serve other functions (adaptation,
synthesis, etc.); it may also-and this is genetically of even broader
84. Id. at 183-85.
35. Id. at 184, By "objective standards" the Court means in the light of evidence
obtained by traditional, not psychoanalytic, data gathering techniques, such as the FBL
36. Id. at 176.
87. Id. at 186.
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significance-through a change of function turn from a means into
a goal in its own right.38
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Seeger thus rests on assumptions
about the nature of man which are in harmony with Hartmann's con-
cept of change of function. The Court delineates an area of legal deci-
sion for which data concerning the unconscious forces at work in any
individual claimant to the process are of no special relevance. Uncon-
scious forces and processes are taken as a given, a common denominator
of all human conduct, and prime focus is placed for purposes of the
legislative and judicial design on conscious reflections of the conscience
-on beliefs whether perceived as externally or internally derived.
Thus Congress broadened the concept of a "religious belief," and
the Supreme Court stretched the legislative definition beyond recog-
nition. Both seemed to have perceived, without the aid of specifically
psychoanalytic insights, that a conscientious objection to all wars may
be so highly personal that meaningful distinctions, for purposes of
exemption, cannot be made either internally in terms of unconscious
origins or externally on the basis of an upbringing within or without
one of the traditional Peace Sects. But the momentum of the reasoning
with which the Court has broadened the exemption for men who ob-
ject to all war should lead it, or more appropriately Congress,30 to
acknowledge the claims of men who oppose only a specific war. For
the same insights which reveal that neither internal nor external fac-
tors allow meaningful distinctions within the category of general
pacifism show that neither can such distinctions be drawn between the
38. H. HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION 25-26 (1958).
Genetically, some of the pertinent questions of structural psychology can be viewed
from the angle of what, borrowing a term from biology, I called "change of function."
It is part of what I now call "secondary autonomy." It means relative functional In-
dependence, despite genetic continuity, and invites marking off more dearly the func-
tional aspect from the genetic one. This relative independence may be more or less
complete. In some cases it is practically irreversible under the conditions of "normal,"
everyday behavior. But we know from experience that even in many of these instances
reversibility can be observed under special conditions, as in dreams, in neuroses and
psychoses, and in analysis.
H. HARTMANN, ESSAYS ON EGO PSYCHOLOGY 142, 152 (1964).
39. Following Seeger, Congress eliminated the supreme being clause in the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1964). Congressional intent (if there
be such a thing) is not dear. The House committee report indicates that the clause was
removed primarily to prevent the "substantial increase in the number of unjustified ap-
peals for exemption" which the Director of Selective Service foresaw under Seeger and at
the same time not to jeopardize legitimate claims of conscientious objection. H.R, Ra,
No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1967). The Senate conferees did not think the action
overruled Seeger, and some members of the House indicated they voted for the revision
because they thought it broadened the ambit of exemption. 113 CONG. REG. 8054 (daily
ed. June 12, 1967); id. at 6245, 6266 (daily ed. May 25, 1967).
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two forms of objection. Just as a conscientious objection may spring
from more than one source, so may a conscientiously held objection
take more than one form or be articulated, in the words of tie Court,
"in a multitude of ways."O4 The same external and internal realities,
with all their multiplicity and interrelationships, may lead one indi-
vidual to conscientiously oppose all war and another individual to
conscientiously oppose only a specific war.41
Unless the Court were to ignore its own emphasis in Seeger upon
"the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives
of their possessors, may be articulated,142 it could only with difficulty
fail to conclude that the beliefs of both the general and specific ob-
jector may assume the same compelling importance in the conscience
of each and should therefore receive equal recognition for purposes of
exemption. The question of the sincerity with which either belief is
held remains "a prime consideration to the validity of every claim"; 43
but there is no reason that this factual inquiry is more difficult for
those professing a specific objection to war than for those professing
a general objection. Against these considerations, of course, decision-
makers must balance, as they do in considering any exemption, the
need for an armed force and the interest of individuals who serve that
others too will do their share in the messy business of war. It may well
be said of the Court's decision, as the Court says of the fundamental
questions it confronts, "that in no field of human endeavor has the
tool of langauge proved so inadequate .... "' But a fuller knowledge
of what psychoanalytic theory can contribute to the study of man and
the origins and manifestations of his actions should force Congress and
the Court to recognize that the distinction between a general and a
specific opposition to war is meaningless by any criterion of respect
for individual integrity and freedom of conscience. 45
On the other hand, for other purposes and in other settings, the
40. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
41. In similar fashion, of course, other individuals may come to support all wars, or
one specific war; still others may not really care in any conscientious sense or be ambivalent
about wars in general, or about a specific war.
42. 380 U.S. at 183.
43. Id. at 185. See generally Clancy & Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption:
Problems in Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional Considerations, 17 M. L Rxv. 143
(1965).
44. 880 US. at 174.
45. The Court in noting "the elusive nature of the inquiry" and in acknouvledging that
"we are not without certain guidelines" cited with approval the language of Chief Justice
Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931): "[Putting aside dogmas
with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itsEf implies respect for
an innate conviction of paramount duty." 380 U.S. at 176.
1069
The Yale Law Journal
same general finding that the similar conduct of different individuals
does not necessarily reflect an identical interplay of psychic forces also
suggests a limitation on the utility of categorizing individuals by ref-
erence to their overt behavior. In this regard, the admonition of Anna
Freud should be of particular interest to decisionmakers and students
of law, particularly those concerned with criminal law, the law of juve-
nile delinquency, and the administration of mental health laws:
[T]he descriptive nature of many of the current diagnostic cate-
gories runs counter to the essence of psychoanalytic thinking, since
it emphasizes the identity of or difference between manifest symp'
tomatology while neglecting those of the underlying , . . factors.
It is true that in this manner a classification.., seems orderly and
comprehensive to the superficial glance. ... Whenever the ana-
lyst accepts diagnostic thinking on this level, he is inevitably led
into confusion in assessment and subsequently to erroneous thera-
peutic inferences.4
Of course, this warning does not lead to the conclusion that all legis-
latively defined categories-such as thief, murderer, rapist, conspirator,
juvenile delinquent, or committable mentally-ill person-are inappro-
priate for all purposes. 47 It may be a useful and workable legislative
strategy to create such categories as a basis for sorting out those who
are entitled to one legal process or another or who may or may not be
considered appropriate objects of community anger. But it is a limi-
tation of the strategy that such categories cannot serve as a basis for
determining who should be provided with what therapeutic regime
or assigned what institutional setting for rehabilitative purposes. It is
confusing, then, to find psychoanalytic studies and research programs
which rest on the assumption that "juvenile delinquent" is a useful
diagnostic category. On the other hand, it is encouraging, for example,
to find emphasized in the report of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement a premise consistent with the essence of psycho-
analytic thinking: "No single formula, no single theory, no single
generalization can explain the vast range of behavior called crime." 48
To the extent the law is concerned with therapeutic goals in respond-
46. A. DFEUD, NoRmALrTY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD 110-11 (1965).
47. See Letter from W. L. Pious, M.D., to the author, October 9, 1967: "While I agree
with your and Anna Freud's position concerning diagnostic classifications and other at.
tempts at descriptive categorization, I would also like to warn against too hasty snubbing
of such categorizations. The fact remains that human behavior does lend itself to classi.
fication and that the basis for this relative uniformity of behavior patterns, arising from
multiple and often unrelated motivations, remains a riddle."
48. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY V (1967).
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ing to the "criminal" or the "juvenile delinquent" or the "mentally
ill," it becomes of enormous value to heed Anna Freud's warning, not
only in directing research but also in framing procedures and insti-
tutional responses. Thus, the psychoanalytic generalization that one
cannot generalize about the nature of an individual or the causes of
his behavior on the basis of his overt conduct makes a significant con-
tribution to law by forcing into view the limitations of conduct-based
categories. Here the psychoanalytic contribution can press the law in
theory and in practice to focus more sharply on those decisions for
which the individual must be decategorized and perceived as the highly
complex human being that he is4
B.
The second general finding is but another face of the first, and seems
obvious once stated. It is that the meaning of an actual experience in
giving direction to a person's life rests on countless internal and ex-
ternal variables. Not only may what appears to be a similar event have
different significance for the same person at different stages in his
development, but it may also have different implications for different
people at similar stages of development.r Implicit in this observation
49. See e.g., Professor George H. Dession's Final Draft of the Code of Correction For
Puerto Rico, 71 YALE L.J. 1050, 1070 (1962), ch. I, sec. 3(4), Individualization of Cor-
rection:
Trends away from indiscriminate retribution and toward the individualization of
correction are embraced in this Code to facilitate more selective and efficient measures
of discipline (general and particular) and of prevention, where these are indicated,
and to reduce unnecessary deprivations of all persons. Such individualization is
deemed desirable by reason of the experience that acts or omissions falling within
any given category of situations subject to correction may be committed by a variety
of personalities ranging from the healthy to the destructive, that adequate and eco-
nomical protection of the community rests on an informal discrimination of such
persons, and that the morale and responsiveness of persons subject to correction to
education or therapy will be jeopardized by lack of such discrimination as by any
other arbitrariness in classification or the shaping of measures.
50. Hartmann & Kris, The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis, Psycnio.OaICAL ISSu
voL 4, no. 2, monograph 14, 1964, at 22 (1964). See also S. FmUD, A Case of Homosexuality
in a Woman, 18 S.E. 147, 167:
So long as we trace the development from its final outcome back.ards, the chain of
events appears continuous, and we feel we have gained an insight which is completely
satisfactory or even exhaustive. But if we proceed the reverse way, if we start from
the premises inferred from the analysis and try to follow these up to the final result,
then we no longer get the impression of an inevitable sequence of events which could
not have been otherwise determined. We notice at once that there might have been
another result, and that we might have been just as well able to understand and ex-
plain the latter. The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory as the analysis; in other
words, from a knowledge of the premises we could not have foretold the nature of
the result.
See generally A. Freud, Child Observation of Prediction and Development, 18 Tim PsY-
CHOANALYUic STUDY OF TuR CHilD 92 (1958); A. FREm, NosrAzr.Y AM PATHOLOGY 14
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is an insight of substantial significance to anyone seeking to predict or
to evaluate the consequences of decisions in law. It points to a limita-
tion, frequently obscured in assumptions, on empirical studies about
the impact or likely impact of a statute, judgment, or administrative
ruling. Unless such decisions are perceived as external events in the
lives of many people-events which have different meanings for dif-
ferent people-statistical evidence of success may include, without
recognizing a distinction, a number of people upon whom the decision
had no impact and, even more significant, may include in the failure
column a number upon whom the decision had not just no impact,
but an impact contrary to that sought. For example, in evaluating a
decision to impose a criminal sanction against a specific offender for
purposes both of satisfying the punitive demands of the community
and of deterring others from engaging in the offensive conduct, the
student of law must recognize that the decision may satisfy some de-
mands for vengeance, exacerbate some, and have no effect at all on
others; and may for some restrain, for some provoke, or for some have
no impact on the urge to engage in the prohibited conduct. Recog-
nition of the multiple consequences of every law-created event makes
comprehensible the never-ending search for multiple resolutions of
what is perceived to be a single problem in law and the resulting need
to find an ensemble of official and unofficial responses which on balance
come closest to achieving the social control sought.
It would seem that the value of this psychoanalytic insight has often
been lost in the stock criticism of psychoanalysis that whatever the
facts, psychoanalysts can always use or fashion them to fit the theory.61
What is lost to the critic engaged in the fruitless exercise of establish.
ing that psychoanalysis is not a science and what is often lost to the
unvary psychoanalyst is the finding that a symptom common to dif-
ferent people may reflect a variety of different dynamic explanations or
causes and that a single "traumatic" event may reverberate in different
ways in different people. The need for reemphasizing this finding is
pointedly illustrated by the Bullitt-Freud book on Wilson -52 and the
Zeligs volume misleadingly subtitled An Analysis of Whittaler Cham.
CHILDHOOD (1965); Waelder, Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy, 10 J. ov
THE A . PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 617 (1962).
51. See S. FREUD, Constructions in Analysis, 23 S.E. 257.
52. S. FREUD 9: W. BuLLI1T, THOMAS WOODROW WILSON: TWENTY-EIGHTH PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES-A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY (1967). For fascinating and conflicting views
of Freud's contribution to the book, compare P. ROAZEN, FREUD: POITCAL AND SOCIAL
THOUGHT 300-22 (1968) with Erikson, The Strange Case of Freud, Bullitt, and Woodrow
Wilson, THE NEvw YORK REmIw OF BooKs, Feb. 9, 1967, at 3-5.
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bers and Alger Hiss.5s This is not to say that a highly skilled and ar-
tistic psychoanalytic observer with access to reliable manifest and
secondary data about a particular individual cannot make perceptive
and probably valid guesses about unconscious content r" But in both
of these books, one of which is based on a major legal confrontation,
the data were neither sufficient nor of sufficient reliability to justify
the specific assertions made about specific individuals concerning spe-
cific events. As Hartmann and Kris have frequently warned: "This is
the reason why a superficial collection of anamnestic data concerning
an individual's childhood is frequently misleading."53
Psychoanalytic theory makes manifest the complexity of man and
the unreliability of conduct-based or event-based categorizations as
sources for predicting conduct and for understanding the intrapsychic
meaning of the conduct or event for any specific individual. That in-
sight rests upon generalizations about the intrapsychic processes at work
in all individuals-about the dynamic interaction of id, ego, and super-
ego, about the functions of the ego and mechanisms of defense, about
the pleasure principle and the reality principle, etc. These generaliza-
tions, particularly those drawn from the genetic points of vantage in
metapsychology concerning the process of growth and development
from birth to adulthood hold the most immediate promise of appli-
cability to problems for decision in law. 0 These problems concern
the process and substance of the disposition of children in a variety of
legal settings, from the initial legal assignment of each child to his
natural parents to child custody decisions ordered or acquiesced in by
the state in proceedings labelled, for example, "neglecting parent,"
"juvenile delinquency, .... adoption," "foster care," "separation," and
"divorce."
To the extent that legal decisions regarding child custody are to
comply with an official policy preference for the child's best interest,
psychoanalytic theory and research findings have a contribution to
make to both substantive guides and procedures for decision. Anna
Freud's work on growth and development, for example, demonstrates
53. M. ZELIGS, FRIENDSHIP AND FRAT CME (1967).
54. See A. F EuD, NoayArLrrY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD 14-15, 21 (1965).
55. Hartmann & Kris, The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis, PSYcIZOLOGICAL ISSUES,
vol. 4, no. 2, monograph 14, 1964, at 7, 22.
56. The genetic propositions describe how any condition under observation has
grown out of an individual's past, and extended throughout his total life span. ...
Genetic propositions state how . . . reactions [such as those against danger or to
frustration] come into being and are used in the course of an individual's life.
Id. 7.
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the need of every child for unbroken continuity of affectionate and
stimulating relationships.57 Her formulation pours content into that
aspect of the law's standard which is concerned with psychological
well-being. It calls into question decisions which split the custody of
a child between two parents or which provide a non-custodial parent
with the right to visit or to force the child to visit. It casts doubt upon
traditional procedures which never finalize a custody decision in di-
vorce but instead allow the court to retain jurisdiction to modify and
remodify custody, Such official invitations to discontinuity in the life
of a child are but illustrative of the many decisions in law which per-
sistently run contrary to the professed purpose of the decisions them-
selves-to serve the child's best interest.
Since dispositions are frequently rendered in divorce proceedings
without presenting the decisionmakers with adequate data about both
the child and the available alternative custodians, a presumption
should be established to favor relatively long-standing and continuing
relationships. Painter v. Bannister5 8 is an interesting and celebrated case
in point. There a father sought to regain the custody of his seven-year-
old son who, at the time of court decision, had been living with his
grandparents for two and one-half years following the death of his
mother. The court was confronted with a request to interrupt a satis-
factory ongoing "parent-figure" child relationship and to make an
abrupt change without any plan for transition to allow for the gradual
reestablishment of a relationship between natural father and son.0 At
the outset the appellate court made clear that its guiding principle
would be the child's best interest. The household of the grandparents
57. See, e.g., A. Freud, Cindy, in J. Go.a smN &- J. KATz, Tnt FAMILY AND T1m LAW
1051, 1053 (1965):
According to the psychoanalyst's experience, the best interests of an infant ara safe-
guarded under the condition that three needs are fulfilled: the need for affection (for
the unfolding and centering of the infant's own feelings); the need for stinulatLion (to
elicit inherent functions and potentialities); and the need for unbroken contilnuty
(to prevent damage done to the personality by the loss of function and destruction
of capacities which follow invariably on the emotional upheavals brought about by
separation from, death or disappearance of the child's first love-objects).
58. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
59. In their Petition for Rehearing before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the attorneys
for Harold Painter argued, without offering a plan: "If, however, the Court remains In
doubt as to whether an abrupt change would serve Mark's interest, a course Is available
whereby Mark can be prepared for a return to his father's home. A carefully planned
program of supervision and preparation can be arranged to facilitate Mark's return to
his own father and his own family, which program would utilize the specialized training
and competence of the Iowa Department of Social Welfare ... as well as the cooperation
of the California State Department of Social Welfare." Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at
59-60. The Petition was denied June 13, 1966; certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
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was described as "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, mid-
west" and that of the father as "unstable, unconventional, arty Bohe-
mian, and probably intellectually stimulating.cO The court correctly
asserted: "It is not our prerogative to determine custody upon our
choice of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits and
we will not do so." 61 It concurred with the trial judge's finding that
both parties were proper and fit. While acknowledging a preference in
law for the natural parent, the court weighed more heavily the child's
best interest and concluded that the existing relationship should not
be disturbed. The court declared:
Mark has established a father-son relationship with [the grand-
father], which he apparently had never had with his natural father.
He is happy, well adjusted and progressing nicely in his develop-
ment. We do not believe it is for Mark's best interest to take him
out of this stable atmosphere in the face of warnings of dire con-
sequences from an eminent child psychologist and send him to an
uncertain future in his father's home. Regardless of our appred-
ation of the father's love for his child and his desire to have him
with him, we do not believe we have the moral right to gamble
with this child's future ....
Despite provocative newspaper headlines charging the court with
depriving a Bohemian parent (and member of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union) of his child because of his style of life, it follows from
the opinion that the court's decision would have been the same even
if the characterization of the competing parties had been reversed.
Evaluated in the light of Anna Freud's need-for-continuity formula-
tion, the decision viewed as precedent can be understood as a deter-
mination made in accord with the overall mandate of the state-the
child's best interests.
In noting that the problems concerned with the legal disposition of
children offer a major opportunity for the application of psychoanalytic
knowledge to law, the word "opportunity" is used advisedly, for there
is in this area a great amount of judicial and student resistance. Judi-
cial decisions abound in which the judge, unhampered by any proce-
dural barriers to the introduction of psychoanalytic evidence of a gen-
eral or specific character, will patiently hear all the evidence and then
render a decision as if the record were free of such guides as those pro-
60. 258 Iowa at 193, 1396, 140 N.W.2d at 154, 156.
61. Id. at 1393, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
62. Id. at 1400, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
63. See, e.g., Halstead v. Halstead, - Iowa -, 144 NWUd 861 (1966).
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vided by Anna Freud. There intrudes, and perhaps correctly so in areas
of compulsory state action, the judge's express concern for parental
rights or for the policy of a foster care agency seeking to preserve the
natural parent's right to the ultimate return of her child-however
remote the possibility. 4 Such disregard of the evidence may for some
reflect a fear that approving the widespread use of psychoanalytic
guides will somehow in other contexts empower the state to mold
whatever kind of adult the state may want at any given time-button
pushers for the new machines, astronauts, or what you will.05 It is here
that effective communication between law and psychoanalysis can be-
gin to remove such misunderstandings, to the extent that they are real.
If the law student (who is also hopefully the future judge) were to
study the primary sources of psychoanalysis, he would see that at most
and at best a psychoanalytically-informed definition of the child's best
interest would assist a court or adoption agency in deciding which dis-
position among available alternatives is likely to provide the child,
whatever his endowments, with the best available opportunity to fulfill
his potential in society as a civilized human being.0 The diverse con-
64. See, e.g., In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959); Rltvo,
Discussion, in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATz, supra note 57, at 1032.
65. See, e.g., C.S. Lawis, TuE ABOLITON OF MAN 72-73 (1962):
For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means . . . the power of
some men to make other men what they please. In all ages, no doubt, nurture and
instruction have, in some sense, attempted to exercise this power. But the situation
to which we must look forward will be novel .... [T]he power will be enormously
increased. Hitherto the plans of educationalists have achieved very little of what they
attempted and indeed, when we read them-how Plato would have every infant "a
bastard nursed in a bureau," and Elyot would have the boy see no men before the
age of seven and, after that, no women, and how Locke wants children to have leaky
shoes and no turn for poetry-we may well thank the beneficent obstinacy of real
mothers, real nurses, and (above all) real children for preserving the human race in
such sanity as it still possesses. But the man-moulders of the new age will be armed
with the powers of an omnicompetent state and an irresistible scientific technique:
we shall get at last a race of conditioners who really can cut out all posterity in what
shape they please [footnotes omitted].
Cf. Statement by Sargent Shriver before The Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Man-
power, and Poverty, Mar. 23, 1967:
I favor the registration and testing of all young Americans at age 16-females as well
as males .... [I]f we registered and tested all youngsters at age 16, we would know
who needs what help early enough to do something-time to perform significant
remedial physical fitness, academic education, and motivational training (emphasis
added).
66. It may prove less awesome, more realistic, and thus more amenable to relevant
data gathering were the guide to decision in the child's best interest cast in terms of "that
which is the least detrimental alternative for the child." See J. GoLsTEIN & J. KATZ, supra
note 57, at 4. See also Erikson, Growth and Crises of the Healthy Personality, Psycuo-
LOGICAL ISSUrS, Vol. 1, no. 1, monograph 1, 1959, at 50, 71:
Why . . . if we know how, do we not tell parents in detail what to do to develop
this intrinsic, this genuine autonomy? The answer is: because when it comes to human
values, nobody knows how to fabricate or manage the fabrication of the genuine
article. . . .Actually, we are learning only gradually what exactly not to do with
what kind of children at what age.
1076
Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence
glomeration of procedures for handling children which have haphaz-
ardly entered the statute books require examination in the light of
this knowledge.
III.
I have tried to pose some questions about law in the light of psycho-
analytic theory, and thus to identify the area of---as well as to locate
some limits to-the potential contribution of psychoanalysis to jurispru-
dence. While the boundaries and the size of the area remain unclear,
it is plain that the student of law who turns to psychoanalysis for a
finished theory offering a complete explanation of any and all human
activity will be either duped or disappointed. For psychoanalytic the-
ory is neither all nor nothing. It is a body of knowledge and hypotheses
which legal scholars and practitioners can add to their other analytic
tools in the continuing effort to better understand and thereby to better
the law.
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